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FAITH-BASED PRIVATE ARBITRATION AS A MODEL FOR 
PRESERVING RIGHTS AND VALUES IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
MICHAEL J. BROYDE*
INTRODUCTION
The original title of the address that formed the basis for this paper, 
“Suggestions for Shari’a Courts based on the Precedent of the Beth Din of 
America,” was something of a misnomer.1 I have already written at some 
length about Jewish law courts successfully creating a model of binding 
private arbitration that helps insure that arbitrational decisions are routinely 
upheld in U.S. courts.2 I have also explored the possibility of developing 
effective religious arbitration according to Islamic law in the United States 
based on the precedent of the Beth Din of America (BDA) and the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) in the United Kingdom.3 Now I would like to 
step back and take a broader view. In this paper I suggest that the kind of 
religiously-oriented private dispute resolution associated with the Jewish 
and Muslim communities can be broadly applicable to a whole host of oth-
er religious and values-oriented communities, and that this trend will serve 
to fill the lacuna created by the movement of American secular law away 
from traditional values, particularly—but not exclusively—in family law. 
* Michael J. Broyde is a Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law and a Senior Fellow at 
the Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion. Professor Broyde is also an ordained 
rabbi, an ordained rabbinical court judge and has served as a rabbinical judge. He served as a member 
(dayan) in the Beth Din of America and was the director of that rabbinical court as well. The author 
would like to thank the three conveners of the Sharia and Halakha conference, Professors Samuel 
Fleischacker, Junaid Quadri, and Mark D. Rosen, for including him. He would also like to thank 
Jacquelyn J. Linzer and Michael Ausubel for their assistance in preparing the manuscript. Since this 
paper originated as a keynote address in the conference, this paper still has some of the feel of a lecture. 
 1.  See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Suggestions for Shari’a Courts Based on the Precedent of 
the Beth Din of America, YOUTUBE (May 14, 2013), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=emqhJBaNuBw&list=PLYw2Vm1u7DI68d9Kk05t0TdOCljd5m8CN&ind
ex=4.
 2.  See Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by 
the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2012–2013). 
 3.  See Michael J. Broyde, Ira Bedzow & Shlomo C. Pill, The Pillars of Successful Religious 
Arbitration: Models for American Islamic Arbitration Based on the Beth Din of America and Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal Experience, 30 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 33–76 (2014). I would like to 
express my appreciation to Emory University for supporting two exceptional graduate students, Ira 
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The modern legal trend, certainly in America, is toward increased val-
idation of private arbitration courts and the relationship-governing rule 
created through contract.4 Courts grant parties wide latitude to craft agree-
ments that specify private arrangements to resolve future disputes. This is 
certainly true in commercial law and is even true in family law, which is 
typically more value-driven. With slightly varying degrees of scrutiny, 
American law generally upholds the ability of individuals, couples, and 
corporations to privately order their own relationships in accordance with a 
broad range of contractual agreements. 
The Federal Arbitration Act5 (FAA) in particular represents a high-
water mark for the contractual approach: courts defer to binding arbitration 
agreements and subject them only to procedural review for matters like 
voluntariness and procedural fairness. Arbitration clauses that include both 
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions are an especially powerful 
means of adopting alternative legal models, even when the chosen forum is 
an arbitration court and the chosen law is religious. Indeed, courts will even 
defer to decisions of panels that operate under principles that are dramati-
cally different from the existing laws of any state—such as Jewish law, 
Islamic law, or even a non-law structure such as Christian conciliation— 
provided parties’ selection of the forum and decisional norms is voluntary 
and the arbitration procedures used are clear and reasonably fair. Done 
right, private arbitration can thus be a viable option for a wide variety of 
religious communities who wish to conduct themselves in accordance with 
privately held religious values that are not reflected in secular state law.6
That religious communities are coming around to embrace this view is 
the culmination of another trend in American society. Over the last sixty 
years, the substance of American law has increasingly come to reflect secu-
lar principles rather than the religious values upon which it was historically 
based. The law has grown increasingly secular, with an increased focus on 
religiously neutral principles of equality and fairness, rather than the histor-
 4.  See infra notes 5–6. 
 5.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1947). Before Congress enacted the FAA, courts were often hostile to 
alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration. See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 105 
N.E. 653, 655 (N.Y. 1914). 
 6.  Indeed, in recent years there has been a considerable increase in articles addressing religious 
arbitration. See, e.g., Farrah Ahmed & Senwung Luk, How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance Per-
sonal Autonomy, 1 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 424 (2012); Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: 
Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV. 157 (2012); Michael A. Helfand, Religious
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1231 (2011); Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA 
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ical commitment to traditional values.7 Not coincidentally, this develop-
ment coincides with significant demographic changes: there is no longer a 
majority religion in the United States. While most Americans still identify 
as Christians, no denomination or sect predominates, and most Christians 
or Jews no longer look to their faith for their basic values.8 Moreover, since 
the mid-twentieth century, the United States has become more of a multi-
cultural society. It is increasingly comfortable with multiple expressions of 
individual and sub-group identity coexisting in the public sphere. In socio-
logical terms, the metaphor of the melting pot has been replaced by a salad 
bowl.9
So while the culture wars still flare, religious communities have begun 
to realize that they are all minority groups, and secular law is no longer 
broadly reflective of traditional values nor will this change in the foreseea-
ble future. Whether this has become apparent to everyone or not, it is moti-
vating religious communities to step outside the framework of secular law 
into the realm of private dispute resolution in order to preserve their com-
munities.10 Even more importantly, the common social fabric has shifted to 
a secular model—gay marriage is just the most public crier of this 
change—which predominates in every value-driven public discussion, 
leaving traditional religious communities feeling less and less comfortable 
with general social mores and at the same time increasingly disconnected 
from common public discourse or law.11
 7.  See, e.g., David Aikman, America’s Religious Past Fades in a Secular Age, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
25, 2012, 
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203630604578073171838000416. 
 8.  Pew Research Center data from 2007 indicated “that the United States is on the verge of 
becoming a minority Protestant country; the number of Americans who report that they are members of 
Protestant denominations now stands at barely 51%.” PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S.
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (Feb. 2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-
religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. By 2012, the prediction had come true. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION &
PUB. LIFE, “NONES” ON THE RISE: ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 13 (Oct. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (“In surveys conducted in 
the first half of 2012, fewer than half of American adults say they are Protestant (48%). This marks the 
first time in Pew Research Center surveys that the Protestant share of the population has dipped signifi-
cantly below 50%.”). 
 9.  CARL N. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA 296 
(1970) (“[T]he metaphor of the melting pot is unfortunate and misleading. A more accurate analogy 
would be a salad bowl, for, though the salad is an entity, the lettuce can still be distinguished from the 
chicory, the tomatoes from the cabbage.”). 
 10.  Some religious communities even welcome this, as they see greater threat from alternative 
religious values than secular ones. See Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law and American Public Policy: A 
Principled Jewish Law View and Some Practical Jewish Observations, in RELIGION AS A PUBLIC 
GOOD: JEWS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 161 (Alan Mittleman ed., 
2003). 
 11.  For just the most recent example of this, see Michael Paulson, Colleges and Evangelicals 
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The Orthodox Jewish community has struggled with this problem for 
decades—preserving religious community while integrating economically 
and socially into secular society to varying degrees.12 Its rabbinical courts 
have developed well-crafted models for enforceable arbitration agreements 
that can be adapted by any interested religious community. The American 
Orthodox Jewish community has had experiences other faiths have not in 
this area, not because it was chosen as a people for this role, but because 
the Christian community was majoritarian and actually sought to shape the 
secular law for many years in this Republic, and the Muslim community 
was absent for the first two centuries of the Republic.13 That peculiar Jew-
ish experience is now becoming the norm for every American religion. 
I. CRAFTING A FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION
DECISIONS
As I have discussed elsewhere,14 when one looks at the “best practic-
es” of the rabbinical courts in America, one can see six principles under-
pinning the system that allows for binding arbitration decisions that the 
secular government is then obliged to enforce.15 Islamic tribunals have 
done much the same in the United Kingdom and will certainly move in that 
direction in the United States.16 But these six principles are not unique to 
Jewish or Islamic law—they are readily transferrable to any minority 
community that wishes to govern itself by common rules or shared values 
that differ substantively from the statutory scheme promulgated by the 
state. 
Extrapolating and summarizing from my prior articles,17 the six prin-
ciples for long-term success are as follows: First, the arbitration panel must 
develop and promulgate standardized, detailed rules of procedure. Uniform 
rules and procedures set clear expectations for the proceedings and protect 
vulnerable parties. More importantly, procedural safeguards are crucial to 
the viability of private arbitration, as courts generally review arbitration 
and-evangelicals-collide-on-bias-policy.html, which discusses how many institutions are forcing reli-
gious student organizations whose values discriminate against homosexual conduct off campus. 
 12.  See Broyde, supra note 2, at 288. 
 13.  See Broyde et al., supra note 3. 
 14.  See Broyde, supra note 2, at 288–89. 
 15.  Of course, I recognize that rabbinical courts do not in every instance and in every location 
follow the best practices consistently. Some have weaker appeals processes or less formal rules. But the 
articulation of consensus best practices serves as a model for how things ought to be done without 
asserting that all practices below the “best” are not legally satisfactory. 
 16.  See Broyde et al., supra note 3, at 36–37. 
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decisions for procedural, rather than substantive fairness. Second, any or-
ganization providing arbitration services should also develop an internal 
appellate process. This reduces the likelihood of errors, increases trust, and 
helps prevent decisions from being routinely overturned by courts. Third, 
the governing rules should spell out choice-of-law provisions to facilitate 
the accommodation of religious traditions and principles as well as secular 
law where possible. 
Fourth, in addition to religious authorities, the arbitration panel should 
employ skilled lawyers and professionals from the panel’s constituent reli-
gious community who can provide expertise in secular law and contempo-
rary commercial practices. Fifth, to ensure the effective resolution of 
commercial arbitrations, the organization should recognize, and to the 
greatest extent possible incorporate into its rulings, the realities of conduct 
in the public arena—even in family law. This is crucial to understanding 
the actions and intent of the parties in common transactions, but perhaps 
more importantly it will instill confidence in potential disputants. After all, 
a dispute resolution system that reflects grand abstract ideals but has little 
notion of business realities is unlikely to attract willing participants. Final-
ly, the tribunal should recognize that an aggregate of individual arbitrations 
will likely give rise to an active role in communal leadership. This is par-
ticularly true among adherents, but it is to be more broadly expected as 
well.
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
First and foremost, other than in child custody disputes,18 American 
law of arbitration pays little attention to notions of substantive due process. 
Neither the government nor the courts have a preconceived notion of the 
 18.  Child custody is the exception that proves the rule. In child custody matters, exactly because 
children are not assets and may not be contractually divided, binding arbitration is limited: judges 
cannot fundamentally engage in only a procedural review; they must engage in substantive review to 
determine the best interests of the child. They have no choice but to ask whether the arbitration panel 
reached the right, or a plausibly right, answer. Whether the arbitration panel is reviewed de novo or for 
harm or some other standard, the predicate of child custody analysis is not procedural due process but 
some form of substantive due process. See, e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 192 A.D.2d 94, 97 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1993) (finding that “[t]he court must always make its own independent review and findings” in 
child custody cases, despite an arbitration award addressing the issue); see also Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 
A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 2009) (finding a N.J. constitutional right to child custody arbitration albeit with de 
novo review). Furthermore, I have noted, “[E]ven in the universe of child custody cases, which are 
reviewed de novo by secular courts in many states, but not allowed in many others, no BDA decision 
has ever been overturned.” Broyde, supra note 2, at 300. As I have shown elsewhere, it is the majority 
view in the Jewish tradition as well that the best interest of the child analysis should be used. See Mi-
chael J. Broyde, Child Custody in Jewish Law: A Conceptual Analysis, 37 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP.
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“right” substantive resolution of most any dispute if the parties contractual-
ly choose to opt for a different resolution or a process that produces a dif-
ferent resolution from what state or federal law might offer.19 Rather, the 
FAA and the myriad state laws that derive from it have a strong notion of 
procedural due process.20 These statutes provide that there are certain 
things arbitration panels may and may not do in the course of decision 
making: they may not call a hearing at 4:00 a.m. on a federal holiday, they 
must provide litigants with a reasonable amount of notice,21 they must con-
duct hearings in a language that the parties understand, arbitrators may not 
have a financial interest in the resolution of the case or financial involve-
ment with the parties, as well as other basic ideas of procedural fair play.22
Within these procedural confines, there is still much room for flexibil-
ity, creativity and alternative solutions. The proceedings can be adversarial, 
inquisitorial, or conciliatory. They can be sealed or open. They can be 
closed to outsiders or broadcasted on television. They can be rather infor-
mal, or the arbitrator can sit on a raised bench in robes and insist that the 
parties address him or her as “Judge” or “Your Honor.”23 They can be 
based on French law, commercial custom, or religious law. 
Religious tribunals recognize that in order for secular courts to honor 
their decisions, they must follow only procedural (rather than substantive) 
due process. The Beth Din of America has promulgated legally sophisticat-
 19.  See Helfand, supra note 6, at 1256. 
 20.  See Michael A. Helfand & Barak Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 
DUKE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
 http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5926&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 21.  See, e.g., JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (July 15, 2009), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-
2009.pdf. Of course, the JAMS policy is only binding when it is incorporated by contract and the 
minimal obligations of the arbitrator under state law are considerably lower. 
 22.  For a reexamination of the basic issues of due process and fairness in this context, see Bradley 
Dillon-Coffman, Comment, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the Arbitration Fairness 
Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2010). 
 23.  Two New York City Civil Court rulings have reached opposite conclusions as to whether 
what happens on “The People’s Court” is arbitration or some other contractually agreed-to form of 
ADR. Compare Kabia v. Koch, 713 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2000) (holding that submission 
of a claim to television court qualifies as arbitration), with Doo Wop Shoppe Ltd. v. Ralph Edwards 
Prods., 691 N.Y.S.2d 253, 253 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1998) (holding that submitting a claim to television court 
did not qualify as arbitration). See Philip Z. Kimball, Syndi-Court Justice: Judge Judy and Exploitation 
of Arbitration, 4 J. AM. ARB. 145, 147, 158 (2005) (describing how syndi-court arbitration distorts the 
public’s conception of what the judicial process is in America); see also Kimberlianne Podlas, Blame 
Judge Judy: The Effects of Syndicated Television Courtrooms on Jurors, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 557, 
586 (2002) (demonstrating that television courtroom programs have an educating but distorting effect 
on potential jurors); Kimberlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television’s Syndicated 
Courtrooms Bias our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 24 (2001) (showing that television courtroom 
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ed rules and procedures that are published on the organization’s website.24
The ICC25 and the MAT have done likewise.26 These rules set out require-
ments such as the number of days between filing and response. They de-
scribe matters like discovery, motion practice, transcription, and the 
appropriate place to file items. They also establish the proper language for 
hearings, the procedure for compiling a record, waiver doctrines, notice 
provisions, and other rules of procedure.27
These rules help a layperson understand what to expect procedurally 
during the process of religious arbitration; to a lawyer, they look a lot like 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But they speak not at all about sub-
stance. One reading these rules would learn nothing about the content of 
Jewish law, Islamic law or Christian jurisprudence. Indeed, the ICC makes 
this clear in its rules, which state directly and simply: 
[Rule] 4. Application of Law 
Conciliators shall take into consideration any state, federal, or local laws 
that the parties bring to their attention, but the Holy Scriptures (the Bi-
ble) shall be the supreme authority governing every aspect of the concili-
ation process.28
Which version of the Bible? Are commentaries or interpretations bind-
ing? Which ones? The ICC provides no guidance as to the substance of the 
law. Rather, the conciliators have broad authority to determine the substan-
tive rules or principles that are applicable to the matter before them. 
The rules of the BDA are even less clear as to the substantive law. 
Rule 3c states simply that “[t]he Beth Din of America accepts that Jewish 
law as understood by the Beth Din will provide the rules of decision . . . .”29
Not only is there no definition of the substance of Jewish law, but by insist-
ing that Jewish law as understood by the Beth Din is the law, substantive 
 24.  BETH DIN OF AMERICA, RULES AND PROCEDURES (2013), available at
http://bethdin.org/docs/PDF2-Rules_and_Procedures.pdf [hereinafter BDA RULES].
 25.  THE INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR CHRISTIAN 
CONCILIATION, available at
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/c.nuIWL7MOJtE/b.5335917/k.D8A2/Rules_of_Procedure.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2014) [hereinafter ICC RULES]. 
 26.  MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, PROCEDURAL RULES OF MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
(2010), available at http://www.matribunal.com/procedure_rules.html [hereinafter MAT RULES]. 
 27.  Perhaps the most startling thing one might encounter in a comparative study of the rules of 
the BDA, ICC, and MAT is how similar they are. With but a few differences, they essentially address 
the same set of issues, namely the procedural rights of the parties in arbitration. Indeed, with but a few 
word changes, the rules of any one of them could serve as rules of each of them. While this might 
incline one to think that they had a common author (which assuredly they did not, as I drafted the BDA 
rules myself many years ago, but I did not write the ICC or MAT rules), the truth is that they are simply 
co-evolutionary identical responses to the pressures of the secular Federal Arbitration Act. 
 28.  ICC RULES, supra note 25, § 4. 
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review becomes impossible, since whatever decision of Jewish law the 
BDA determines to be correct is by definition the Jewish law as understood 
by the Beth Din.
Similar to this, the MAT rule states: 
[Rule 8] Giving of determination 
[](1) In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal may consider but not be 
bound by any previous decision of the Tribunal. 
(2) In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal shall take into account the 
Laws of England and Wales and the recognized Schools of Islamic Sa-
cred Law.30
There are no clear rules of decision in any of these three arbitration 
tribunals that any court can review for consistency and proper application. 
Consider a simple hypothetical example concerning a commercial dispute 
between a kosher food provider and a customer about whether Jewish law 
considers pigs’ feet to be kosher.31 If the BDA were to determine that they 
were kosher, a secular court could not review that determination to see if it 
was consistent with Jewish law, as it is “Jewish law as understood by the 
Beth Din.”32 The decisions of arbitrators are not subject to review by secu-
lar courts for errors of law. 
This fits well with our understanding of the role of secular courts in 
reviewing religious arbitration: they are limited to procedural review. Secu-
lar courts can and do evaluate whether secular procedural due process was 
complied with, and whether general notions of fair play were observed, but 
they cannot tell you what the substantive rules of Jewish, Islamic or Chris-
tian law are.33 Even if they could, religious arbitration organizations write 
their rules to prevent that review.34 Arbitration law mandates that arbitra-
tion organizations have rules that protect basic procedural rights (and not 
basic substantive rights), and they do: no other review is needed. 
 30.  MAT RULES, supra note 26, § 8. 
 31.  There is no view in Jewish law that considers them kosher, as the Bible explicitly states that 
pork is not kosher. See Leviticus 11:7. 
 32.  See supra note 24, § 3(c). 
 33.  While in theory disputants could have a choice of forum provision that selects a state court 
and a choice of law provision that specifies Jewish law, in which case the state court might very well 
make a determination of what Jewish law is in the first instance, that is much different from a secular 
court being asked to review someone else’s determination of Jewish law. For examples of this first 
phenomena, see Daniel Ashburn, Appealing to a Higher Authority? Jewish Law in American Judicial 
Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295 (1994). 
 34.  By defining, for example, Jewish law not in reference to its historical meaning, but in refer-
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III. APPEALS PROCESS
It is important that religious arbitration panels develop internal review 
processes. To err is human, and all arbitration panels sometimes err. Some-
times they err in judgment, sometimes in fact. Sometimes the errors are 
painfully obvious or even laughable, as even great people sometimes make 
simple mistakes. Sometimes there are errors in transcription. Many of these 
procedural errors can result in a court overturning an arbitration award. An 
appellate process is thus an important safeguard that allows an arbitral or-
ganization to correct its mistakes internally before those mistakes are 
brought to the attention of a reviewing court that may well vacate the tribu-
nal’s decision entirely. 
Without an internal appellate process to correct one’s own procedural 
mistakes, a court will step in and do it, pointing to the provisions of the 
FAA or state law.35 An internal appellate procedure allows for a basic error 
correction process that produces regularly valid decisions, as it forces the 
litigants to share with the arbitral organization their claims of error and 
allows the private arbitrator to correct its own error before the litigants do 
so in court. Good arbitration rules, then, spell out the grounds for error and 
procedures to initiate an appeal. 
Consider, as a starting point, Jewish law, which does not intrinsically 
have an appellate process, but permits one by contract.36 Based on this, the 
Rules of the Beth Din of America state simply and directly that: 
[Rule] 31 Modification of Award 
On written application of a party to the Beth Din within twenty (20) days 
after delivery of the award to the applicant, the Beth Din may modify the 
award if (a) there was a mathematical miscalculation; or (b) there was a 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in 
the award; or (c) the award is based upon an issue not submitted to the 
Beth Din and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of 
the decision upon the issues submitted; or (d) the award is imperfect in a 
matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy; or (e) the Av 
 35.  Consider the following example: The parties agree to a submission deadline of March 25. The 
arbitrator hearing the matter hastily jots down a squiggly five, which is later transcribed to the file as a 
three. The arbitrator then closes the matter on March 23, and, finding that one party failed to make a 
timely submission, issues an award on March 24, in favor of the other party. The arbitrator has commit-
ted a procedural error. A secular court judge presented with this case will find the award unenforceable, 
as the record should have remained open for another two days. For a rabbinical court appeal with this 
fact pattern, see Broyde, supra note 2, at 310–11 (in Anonymous v. Anonymous, the court vacated the 
original decision for procedural error and remanded it with order to reopen the record and allow De-
fendant’s submission as timely). 
 36.  See J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 17–45 (1995); J. David Bleich, 
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Beth Din determines that a provision of the award is contrary to Jewish 
Law.37
This type of rule can be found just as clearly in the rules and procedures of 
the Institute for Christian Conciliation: 
[Rule] 41. Request for Reconsideration 
A. A party may submit a request to the Administrator for reconsideration 
of a decision within twenty (20) calendar days after the day the decision 
was received by the parties. 
B. A request for reconsideration will not be considered if it simply asks 
the arbitrators to review the evidence and change their decision. 
C. A request for reconsideration is appropriate only when the arbitrators 
(1) have deviated from these rules or from the arbitration agreement; (2) 
have patently misunderstood a party; (3) have failed to address an issue 
or have made a decision outside the issues presented to the arbitrators by 
the parties; or (4) have made a miscalculation or a mistake of identifica-
tion.38
Unlike the BDA, the ICC rules seem to allow reconsideration by the 
same arbitrators or alternatively by an Administrator. But its purpose is to 
correct error. 
Because decentralization is an internally important feature of Islamic 
law,39 the traditional Islamic adjudication process also did not include a 
formal right of appeal or reconsideration. Traditionally, the Islamic judicial 
system was not formally hierarchical,40 and the decision of any panel was 
considered final and binding. Thus, Islamic courts do not provide an inter-
nal appellate procedure. Nevertheless, acknowledging that its arbitration 
process operates within the legal framework created by British law, MAT 
rules expressly acknowledge that a party may apply for judicial review of 
its arbitral awards, creating a quasi-appeal process.41 But, in truth, a close 
read of the MAT rules reveals a reconsideration process that serves much 
the same role as an appellate process. Consider the following three rules: 
[Rule 23] Appeals 
[] No appeal shall be made against any decisions of the Tribunal. This 
rule shall not prevent any party applying for Judicial Review with per-
mission of the High Court.42
 37.  BDA RULES, supra note 24, § 31a. 
 38.  ICC RULES, supra note 25, § 41. 
 39.  See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 257 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 40.  See TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI, TOWARDS A FIQH FOR MINORITIES: SOME BASIC REFLECTIONS
xiii–xiv (Arthur A. Shamis trans., 2003). 
 41.  See MAT RULES, supra note 26, § 23. 
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This rule, if taken alone, would seem clear and directly counter my hypoth-
esis that an internal appeals process is needed. But if one examines the 
rules of the MAT in total, one sees that there is an error correcting process 
in place that goes by a term other than “appeals.” Rule 21 states directly: 
[Rule 21] Errors of procedure 
[] (1) Where, before the Tribunal has determined a case or application, 
there has been an error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a 
rule— 
subject to these Rules, the error does not invalidate any step taken in the 
proceedings, unless the Tribunal so orders; and 
the Tribunal may make any order, or take any other step, that it considers 
appropriate to remedy the error. 
[] (2) In particular, any determination made in a case or application un-
der these Rules shall be valid notwithstanding that the determination was 
not made or served, within the time period specified in these Rules.43
And Rule 22 makes this even clearer: 
[Rule 22] Correction of orders and determinations 
[] (1) The Tribunal may at any time amend an order, notice of decision 
or determination to correct a clerical error or other accidental slip or 
omission. 
(2) Where an order, notice of decision or determination is amended un-
der this rule, the Tribunal must serve an amended version on the party or 
parties on whom it served the original.44
What we have here is not a process of appeal to a higher authority, but an 
elaborate procedure akin to a motion for reconsideration in which a litigant 
who sees error in a decision can point out the error to the original panel, 
which may then correct itself. Although in this author’s view, there is a 
weakness in the MAT rules in that the process is not well described, the 
result is the same: an internal procedure to correct error.45
 43.  Id. § 21. 
 44.  Id. § 22. 
 45.  Nor is the process of appeal unique to religious arbitration. Part of a recent JAMS advertising 
campaign was aimed at dispelling “one of the biggest myths about arbitration,” namely, “that there is no 
avenue to appeal.” See JAMS, Five Things You Didn’t Know about Arbitration, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 29, 
2014, 5:04 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/advertising/article/five_things_you_didnt_know_about_arbitration/.  
The advertisement explains that: 
Perhaps one of the biggest myths about arbitration is that there is no avenue to appeal. This is 
not the case, and hasn’t been for many years. The International Institute for Conflict Preven-
tion and Resolution (CPR) and JAMS have, for many years, offered appellate procedures that 
provide a formal structure for appeal to either a single arbitrator or tripartite panel. The Amer-
ican Arbitration Association has recently issued its own Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules. 
Keep in mind that not every arbitration is well suited to an appeal, but incorporation of an ap-
pellate process can lessen the risks and provide some peace of mind.  
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Not surprisingly, the grounds used by all three of these tribunals are 
essentially the grounds that would cause a reversal under the secular law of 
the land, with the exception of provision (e) of the rules of the BDA, a 
distinctive feature of the BDA, modeled on the rules of the Rabbinical 
Courts of Israel, who also have this form of review, and which will be ex-
plained below. 
One could easily advance a further point: a litigant who chooses not to 
use the error correcting process provided by the arbitration panel and its 
rules could be said to have waived her right to allege that error in secular 
court under the well-known doctrine of exhaustion of administrative re-
view. Although I am aware of no case law to make this point, it seems logi-
cal that just as one cannot appeal the decision of an administrative agency 
to court without first exhausting the review process internal to the agency, 
the same ought to be true of the appellate panel of an arbitration organiza-
tion. As the classical law review article on this topic by Professor Raoul 
Berger noted in its opening sentences in 1939, “Administrative remedies 
must be exhausted before resort is had to the federal courts. The doctrine is 
as old as federal administrative law, and in the fifty years that have elapsed 
since the early decisions it has been expounded in a formidable mass of 
case law.”46
It is reasonable to rule that an arbitration agreement (contract) that di-
rects the parties to obey the process of arbitration should function like an 
administrative agency: before running to court, an unhappy disputant must 
exhaust the internal process. Indian tribes (whose resemblance to insular 
religious communities requires much further examination) already do so in 
their arbitration agreements.47 Indeed, it would be wise if religious arbitra-
tion panels were to make this clear by inserting the following additional 
sub-rule (as a new section 31c of the BDA rules and 41d of the ICC rules): 
Exhaustion of Modification of Award Process under this Rule: Litigants 
must first exhaust the Modification of Award process found in this rule 
before contesting the confirmation of any award issued by this tribunal in 
9ebc-438e54e78af8%7D_AAA_ICDR_Optional_Appellate_Arbitration_Rules.pdf. In fact, CPR first 
published an arbitration appeals procedure in 1999. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT 
PREVENTION, CPR ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE AND COMMENTARY 1, available at 
http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20Rules/CPR%20Arbitratio
n%20Appeal%20Procedure.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
 46.  Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981, 981 (1939). 
 47.  See, e.g., VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIANS TRIBAL CODE, TORT LIAB. ORDINANCE
§ 6.01 (Nov. 20, 2013), available at http://viejas.com/sites/default/files/Tort_Liability.pdf (“Exhaustion 
of Tribal Dispute Process. Claimant must first exhaust the Viejas Band’s Tribal Dispute Process for 
resolving a Claim as provided in Sections 6 and 7. Claimant’s failure to do so or to strictly comply with 
any aspect of the Tribal Dispute Process shall result in Claimant’s loss of any right to pursue a Claim 
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any other forum or court. Either party’s failure to do shall be deemed a 
waiver of the underlying claim that could have been the subject of a 
Modification of Award motion. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW TO VARIOUS RELIGIOUS FAITHS
Why does only the BDA have an appeals ground that allows reversal 
based on a determination by the lead jurist that a panel’s decision is contra-
ry to religious law?48 This indicates a desire of a religious arbitration organ-
ization to build an internally coherent legal system of its own by reversing 
decisions of panels that adjudicated its own religious law incorrectly,49 and 
is reflective of different religious views to law. The Orthodox Jewish tradi-
tion is very, very (maybe another “very” is actually needed!) law driven 
and considers its court systems to be fundamentally governed by a set of 
rules that are part of the Jewish tradition, albeit sometimes tempered by 
doctrines of equity or even compassion, perhaps no different from any legal 
system.50 Decisions can then be “wrong” in the sense that the chief judge or 
his designee determines that they are contrary to one provision or another 
of Jewish law.51 Islamic law is similar to Jewish law in its law focus, but 
distinctly different in its approach to panel adjudication52 in that the Islamic 
tradition is extremely case and controversy driven in its adjudication and 
favors allowing the individual decisor or decisors full autonomy to deter-
mine the law and equities of any given case, without any possible appeal.53
The contemporary Protestant Christian tradition does not see itself in 
that model. Law is not the central feature of their religious life and there is 
no independent legal code of Protestant Christian law, creating little prece-
dent and thus no possibility of reversal on the grounds of Christian legal 
error.54 Computational or descriptive error of course is possible, but since 
there is no legal code beyond that of secular law, there is no legal error 
either.
It is for this reason that factual or procedural error is the universal 
grounds for appeal in each of these organizations, but substantive error of 
 48.  See BDA RULES, supra note 24, § 31a(e). 
 49.  For a discussion of why such an appellate process is valid as a matter of secular law, see Lang 
v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011), where an appellate decision of the Beth Din of Ameri-
ca that reversed the decision of the arbitrators as a matter of Jewish law is discussed. 
 50.  See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 46–74 (Bernard Auer-
bach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., Jewish Publication Society 1994). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.  
 53.  See Broyde et al., supra note 3, at 51. 
 54.  See generally 2 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS & HUMAN 
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one’s own religious law is present only in the Jewish tradition. What ac-
counts for these different attitudes to systemic law between the Jewish, 
Christian, and Islamic traditions involves theology almost as much as any-
thing else. More than twenty-five years ago, the late professor Robert Cov-
er of Yale Law School noted a crucial difference between the rights-based 
approach of common law countries and the duties-based approach of Jew-
ish law. He remarked: 
Social movements in the United States organize around rights. When 
there is some urgently felt need to change the law or keep it in one way 
or another a “Rights” movement is started. Civil Rights, the right to life, 
welfare rights, etc. The premium that is to be put upon an entitlement is 
so coded. When we “take rights seriously” we understand them to be 
trumps in the legal game. In Jewish law, an entitlement without an obli-
gation is a sad, almost pathetic thing.55
I suspect that while Professor Cover is speaking about “social move-
ments,” what he really means is contemporary Christian ethics with its 
emphasis on many values other than law. This is part of the contrast be-
tween the Jewish mindset of obligation and duty and the Christian mindset 
of rights and needs. The Christian (and particularly Protestant) approach 
simply does not view “laws,” “rules,” or “obligations” as the central 
framework upon which to consider complex issues of society. Many other 
virtues, including “love” and “mercy,” successfully compete with “rules” 
and “law” for the heart and soul of society in a Christian community and 
serve as the central features of Christian jurisprudence.56
Indeed, many religious movements in the United States identify love 
as an overarching guiding principle. When there is some urgently felt need 
to change a doctrine or keep it in one way or another, the principle of 
“love” is frequently invoked to justify the modification of the law. When 
Christianity takes love seriously, love supersedes other values and creates 
some sort of entitlement to be whom one wants, as God’s love will end in 
an accepting embrace.57 But Jewish law embodies an approach where “an 
 55.  Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 
65, 67 (1987). 
 56.  Professor Chaim Saiman of Villanova University School of Law has written insightfully 
about the sources of these fundamental differences and how they still resonate today in a number of 
ways. See Chaim Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 97, 100–01 
(2007–2008) (arguing that the polarized positions in many contemporary debates within American 
law—law versus equity, procedural versus substantive justice, rules versus standards, formalism versus 
instrumentalism, and textualism versus contextualism—can be seen as manifestations of a fundamental 
disagreement between the rabbinic Jewish understanding of law and Christian jurisprudence as repre-
sented in the Gospels). 
 57.  Insofar as “love” is a term that implies unconditional acceptance, Christianity’s belief in 
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entitlement without an obligation is a sad, almost pathetic thing” as Profes-
sor Cover notes.58 Law, and not love, remains the trump card in classical 
Jewish discourse about Jewish values.59
V. DUAL-SYSTEM FLUENCY
The religious courts (of any flavor) functioning as arbitration panels 
that wish to take advantage of secular law’s endorsement and enforcement 
of private arbitration have to be sensitive to both religious and secular 
norms in order to get the cases right. More particularly, religious arbitration 
panels have to be right in three senses: religiously, legally, and culturally.60
Being right religiously means that the panel is correctly applying the tech-
nical rules of the faith to the problem at hand. Being right legally means 
that the panel is producing a decision that the secular legal system will 
enforce.
Being right culturally is the hardest to understand, but just as im-
portant. When an arbitration panel loses—within its own religious commu-
nity—the appearance of religious legitimacy (that deep sense of the 
community of the faithful that this religious court is part of that communi-
ty), community members will refuse to participate in the workings of this 
panel. On the other hand, and equally so, if the secular legal community 
(which ultimately is the source of the religious panel’s coercive authority, 
through contract enforcement) senses that the religious tribunal cannot be 
the Christian feels entitled to be what he wants to be and do what he wants to do, knowing all the while 
that in the end, God’s love for him will end in an accepting embrace.  
 58.  Cover, supra note 55, at 67. 
 59.  See, e.g., 1 SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND 
OBSERVANCES xxxvii (Dayan Dr I. Grunfeld trans., The Soncino Press 1962) (“[T]he operative word in 
Judaism is not ‘faith’ but ‘law’ . . . . The chief purpose of man on earth from the point of view of the 
Torah is not metaphysical speculation or abstract thought, but moral action.”). 
 60.  The virtues of dual system fluency are not merely in adjudication, of course. In my conversa-
tion with Justice Menachem Elon of the Israeli Supreme Court, he observed many times that when he 
would lecture on Jewish law in medieval Europe he would explain that, centuries ago, Jews could 
engage in international commerce when no one else could, as they were dual system fluent. He would 
observe that a Polish Catholic who wanted to sell a product in Protestant Germany was not able to, 
because the seller and the buyer could not agree on a law, a language, or a court to resolve disputes 
should they arise. But the Jews, with their cross-border commonalities of a language (Yiddish), a law 
(Jewish law), and a legal system (the rabbinical courts), could serve as such middle men. Thus, a Polish 
Catholic could sell merchandise to a Polish Jew in accordance with Polish law, and the Jew could take 
the product to Germany and sell it to a German Jew in their shared language of Yiddish, in accordance 
with Jewish law and subject to adjudication in the shared legal system they both honor. The German 
Jew would then sell it to a Protestant German merchant in accordance with German law. Having a 
common language, legal system, and religious tribunals allows for the resolution of common disputes 
and builds community. Of course, the existence of a formal transnational mercantile law in pre-modern 
times is a subject of great historical dispute, but Justice Elon’s point reflects at least one of the per-
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trusted to genuinely adhere to the procedural norms needed to guarantee 
enforcement,61 then the secular courts will remove this arbitration panel 
from access to the commonwealth of justice, either on a case-by-case or 
wholesale basis. 
But, in truth, there is a deeper problem present that is part of the dual 
system issue: it is quite possible that religious tribunals lose track of what is 
actually occurring on a commercial level. Sometimes in the Jewish law 
world, rabbinical courts are applying Jewish law faithfully but the commu-
nity is not: they have already adopted the commercial law norms of the 
general society in which they live and work and have fully integrated secu-
lar law norms within the Jewish law. Thus, the religious arbitrators ought to 
be people who are comfortably enmeshed in the community and also fol-
low the details of what is actually occurring commercially.62
The Jewish law story is probably typical of many faiths. In Jewish 
law: (1) any condition that is agreed upon with respect to monetary matters 
is valid under Jewish law;63 and (2) customs established among merchants 
acquire Jewish law validity,64 provided that the practices stipulated or 
commonly undertaken are not otherwise ritually prohibited by Jewish 
law.65 These two principles are arguably interrelated; commercial customs 
are sometimes said to be binding because business people implicitly agree 
to abide by them.66 The Code of Jewish Law (Shulchan Aruch) makes it 
clear that common commercial practices override many default Jewish law 
rules that would otherwise govern a transaction.67 Moreover, these customs 
 61.  Because they do not know how to conform to basic secular standards or because they choose 
not to for either religious reasons or, most commonly, they have no one who can explain to them how to 
conform to secular norms, since they do not think those norms are valuable religiously. 
 62.  The Jewish tradition has a long and storied interaction with secular law and elaborate doc-
trines of incorporation, as this article notes. Islamic law is beginning that process, as its history is not as 
a diaspora religion residing in a secular environment. For more on this, see KATHLEEN M. MOORE, THE
UNFAMILIAR ABODE: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN (2010).
 63.  See generally ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw 880–87 (Menachem 
Elon ed., 1975).  
 64.  Id.
 65.  For example, Jewish law prohibits a debtor from offering a “pound of flesh” as collateral for a 
loan, and even if the borrower, the lender, and the general community of merchants accept such a practice, 
Jewish law would nonetheless reject such practice as invalid. See RABBI SHELOMOH YOSEF ZEVIN, Mishpat 
Shylock Lefi Ha-Halakhah [Shylock in Jewish Law], in LE-OR HA-HALAKHAH: BE’AYOT U-VERURIM 310 
(2d ed. 1957) (Isr.). 
 66.  The Mishnah pronounces the validity of commercial customs. It states: 
What is the rule concerning one who hires workers and orders them to arrive at work early or 
to stay late? In a location where the custom is to not come early or stay late, the employer is 
not allowed to compel them [to do so] . . . . All such terms are governed by local custom. 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS 373 (Adam Levine ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) 
(quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 83a). 
 67.  RABBI YOSEF KARO, Choshen Mispat 331:1, in SHULCHAN ARUCH (Ketuvim ed. 1992) (Isr.). 





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P05 - BROYDE (WITH SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO BLOCK QUOTES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:35 AM
2015] FAITH-BASED PRIVATE ARBITRATION 127 
are valid even if the majority of the business people establishing them are 
not Jewish, simply because they are the norm. As Rabbi Moses Feinstein 
explains:
It is clear that these rules which depend on custom . . . need not be cus-
toms . . . established by Torah scholars or even by Jews. Even if these 
customs were established by non-Jews, if the non-Jews are a majority of 
the inhabitants of the city, Jewish law incorporates the custom. It is as if 
the parties conditioned their agreement in accordance with the custom of 
the city.68
Most authorities rule that such customs are legally valid according to 
Jewish law even if they were established because secular law required the 
particular conduct.69
VI. RESPECT FOR BOTH RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR LEGAL NORMS
A religious tribunal not only has to know the religious law and secular 
law, it has to be familiar with the street law, so as to know which legal 
code—or some hybrid—is actually being followed by people. Sometimes, 
truth be told, no legal code is being followed at all, just a commercial cus-
tom. 
Allow two illustrative examples: Jewish law rules that when one steps 
into a supermarket and picks up a jar of spaghetti sauce to put it in one’s 
cart and the jar slips and breaks, the one who broke it purchased it and has 
to pay for it.70 On the other hand, the accepted practice in American law is 
clear that such is not the case and the customer has not yet purchased the 
et ha-halakhah [Custom supersedes halakhah]); RABBI JOSEPH COLON, RESPONSA OF MAHARIK no. 
102; RABBI SAMUEL DI MEDINA, RESPONSA OF MAHARASHDAM no. 108. 
 68.  RABBI MOSES FEINSTEIN, Hoshen Mishpat 1:72, in IGGEROT MOSHE; see also RABBI YEHIEL 
MICHEL EPSTEIN, Hoshen Mishpat 73:20, in ARUKH HA-SHULHAN; see generally Rabbi Steven H. Resni-
coff, Bankruptcy: A Viable Halachic Option?, 24 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 5, 10–14 (1992) (who 
discusses this issue at great length). 
 69.  See, e.g., FEINSTEIN, supra note 68; RABBI ISAAC BLAU, PITHEI HOSHEN, DINEI HALVA’AH, ch. 2,
¶ 29 n.82; RABBI ISAAC AARON ETTINGER, MAHARYAH HA-LEVI 2:111; RABBI DAVID HAZZAN, NEDIV 
LEV no. 12; RABBI ELIYAHU HAZZAN, NEDIV LEV no. 13; RABBI ABRAHAM KAHANA-SHAPIRO, DVAR
AVRAHAM 1:1; RABBI ISRAEL LANDAU, BEIT YISRAEL no. 172. For example, RABBI JOSEPH IGGERET,
DIVREI YOSEF no. 21, states: 
One cannot cast doubt upon the validity of this custom on the basis that it became established 
through a decree of the King that required people to so act. Since people always act this way, 
even though they do so only because of the King’s decree, we still properly say that everyone 
who does business without specifying otherwise does business according to the custom. 
There is no reason to assume that these customs would not be valid if international law gave rise to such 
practices. See Michael J. Broyde, Public and Private International Law from the Perspective of Jewish 
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS 373 (Aaron Levine ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2010). 
 70.  This is called kinyan mishicha. See KARO, supra note 67, at 198:1. It is possible that there is 
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item.71 In theory, were one to run a supermarket according to Jewish law, 
one could hang a sign that said, “If you’re Jewish and you break an item, 
you bought it as per Jewish law; if you’re a Gentile, the U.C.C. governs 
and it’s on the house.” But Jewish tradition recognized centuries ago that 
shopkeepers were not in fact acting this way: the common commercial 
practice was to defer to secular law norms on many matters of sale law, 
because Jews participated in an integrated economy and it was easier to 
adopt those secular norms.72 Though there are occasional exceptions,73 the 
Jewish tradition generally is to buy, sell, and otherwise conduct business 
according to the norms and practices of the secular marketplace.74 If rab-
binical courts of arbitration do not understand these street norms, decisions 
are not resolved “correctly.” 
The real world contains even more complex cases, where determining 
what really is the law and the custom is far from clear. Consider for exam-
ple the sale of marijuana in the United States. It is a federal crime to sell 
marijuana, medical or otherwise.75 Per the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, federal law supersedes state statutes, and states cannot abro-
gate federal law.76 Yet, in several states, there are in fact medical marijuana 
dispensaries in which bona fide commercial transactions take place; in 
some states, such sales are “legal” even outside a pharmacy.77 Are these 
sales actually legal or illegal as a matter of Jewish law? How should a rab-
binic court consider a debt collection action for merchant credit extended to 
purchase marijuana? Is it a valid debt because Jewish law does enforce a 
contract of payment for an illegal action?78 Is it invalid because secular law 
prohibits, through the clean hands doctrine, lawsuits for relief in illegal 
 71.  See U.C.C. § 2-204 (1977), for an indication as to why this might be the case. 
 72.  See supra notes 66 and 67. 
 73.  For example, a rabbi’s contract of employment might be adjudicated purely in accordance 
with Jewish law. 
 74.  This tradition is very old, and traces itself back to the Talmudic attempt to harmonize itself 
with Roman law on the issue of market overt. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kama 115a (E. W. 
Kirzner trans.), available at http://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Baba_Kama.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 
2014); Michael Broyde & Stephen Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The Corpo-
rate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685 (1997). 
 75.  See Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801–904 (1970). 
 76.  U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . .”). 
 77.  See Medical Cannabis in the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medical_cannabis_in_the_United_States (last modified Sept. 25, 2014, 
7:57 PM) (particularly the entry under Colorado which notes that all recreational sales are legal in that 
state). 
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transactions?79 Is it valid because state law validates the sale,80 or valid 
because people on the street are actually doing this?81 Or is it an illegal 
transaction since it violates federal law and the Jewish tradition validates 
such illegality through the “law of the land” doctrines that would point to 
federal law?82 Is the Jewish law in Georgia then different from that in Colo-
rado? One cannot answer these questions in the abstract.83 The point of this 
example is not to discuss marijuana sales and Jewish law but to emphasize 
that to successfully arbitrate, one needs to know not only one’s own reli-
gious tradition and law, and secular law, but the facts on the ground that 
craft the commercial question that people are actually confronting. 
Furthermore, arbitrators might make a decision that is not a complete-
ly wrong decision, but merely a decision that is “no longer correct,” if it 
was the right decision at a different time and place. Consider the ketubah—
the premarital document traditional Jews sign prior to a wedding.84 The 
Jewish tradition has required since time immemorial that couples marry 
with a prenuptial agreement called a ketubah whose text mandates how 
much the husband should pay the wife if he divorces her without cause.85
Among European Jews, this contractual tradition did not continue much be-
yond the end of the first millennium of the Common Era. Through the efforts 
of the luminous leader of tenth-century European Jewry, Rabbenu Gershom, a 
decree86 was enacted that moved Jewish law toward a covenantal model of 
 79.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29–33 (2005), which notes that such laws are void under 
the Supremacy Clause. 
 80.  See, e.g., Vivian Cheng, Comment, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105 (2013) (arguing that state law legality is enough). 
 81.  Id. at 128 (noting that Colorado "has more medical marijuana dispensaries than McDonalds 
[sic] and Starbucks combined" (footnote omitted)). 
 82.  Since the Jewish law doctrine of “the law of the land” might mandate that Federal law be 
followed per the Supremacy Clause. Or maybe not, and the law of the land doctrine mandates that one 
follow the law of one’s home state only. 
 83.  I, for example, think that Jewish law would enforce a merchant debt entered for the purchase 
of marijuana in a state where such a sale is legal, even as it violates Federal law, and hope to write a 
future article explaining the issues in such a case. This is grounded in the two-sided idea that Jewish law 
expects people to obey the law of the land as enforced and that the common commercial custom is to 
consider such transactions as valid in those states which permit it, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
clear rule to the contrary in Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 29–33. Needless to say, the religious obligation to 
obey the law of the land is made much more complex when various portions of the law are intentionally 
left unenforced by secular authorities. 
 84.  See Michael Broyde & Jonathan Reiss, The Ketubah in America: Its Value in Dollars, its Signifi-
cance in Halacha and its Enforceability in American Law, 47 J. HALACHA AND CONTEMP. SOC. 101, 101 
(2004).  
 85.  As well as other things. 
 86.  “The decree of Rabbenu Gershom was enacted under penalty of ban of excommunication (herem).
The collective decrees of Rabbenu Gershom are thus known as Herem deRabbenu Gershom.” Michael J. 
Broyde, New York’s Regulation of Jewish Marriage: Covenant, Contract or Statute?, in MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL 
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marriage and away from a contract model.87 Rabbenu Gershom’s view was 
that it was necessary to restrict the rights of the husband and prohibit unilat-
eral no-fault divorce by the husband.88 Divorce was limited to cases of prova-
ble fault or mutual consent.89 In only a few cases could the husband actually 
be forced to divorce his wife or the reverse, and in such cases, the ketubah did 
not govern, since its provisions do not apply to faulted divorce.90
In those places where the decrees of Rabbenu Gershom were imple-
mented, the basis for Jewish marriage changed. While in Talmudic and 
Gaonic times, the parties pre-negotiated the amount the husband would have 
to pay his wife if he divorced her against her will—she could not prevent her 
husband from divorcing her, except by setting the payment level high enough 
that the husband was deterred from divorce by dint of its cost.91 All this 
changed in light of the decrees of Rabbenu Gershom.92 Couples would have 
to negotiate payments to facilitate divorce that one wanted more than the oth-
er, and the ketubah stopped being a contract.93 Rabbenu Gershom’s ban 
against divorcing a woman without her consent or without a showing of hard 
fault94 called into question the value of the marriage contract itself. Simply 
put, the Talmudic rabbis instituted the ketubah payments to deter the husband 
from rashly divorcing a wife. But now, since the husband could not divorce 
his wife without her consent, there seemed to be no further need for the ketu-
bah.95 As Rabbi Moses Isserles (Rama), the leading codifier of European 
Jewry, wrote at the beginning of his discussion of the laws of the ketubah
 87.  MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW: A
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGUNAH PROBLEMS IN AMERICA 21 (2001). 
 88.  Id.
 89.  Id.
 90.  Id.
 91.  See supra note 84. 
 92.  This insight is generally ascribed to the 12th century Tosafist Rabbenu Tam in his view of the 
repugnancy claim (Heb.: mais alay). Id. In fact, it flows logically from the view of Rabbenu Gershom, who 
not only had to prohibit polygamy in order to end coerced divorce, but even divorce for soft fault. Id.
 93.  Absent the prohibition on polygamy, the decree restricting the right to divorce would not work, as 
the husband who could not divorce would simply remarry and abandon his first wife. This prevented that 
conduct. 
 94.  In which case, the value of the ketubah need not be paid as a penalty for misconduct imposed on 
the woman. What exactly is hard fault remains a matter of dispute, but it generally includes adultery, spouse 
beating, insanity, and frigidity. See RABBI YOSEF KARO, EVEN HAEZER 154, in SHULCHAN ARUCH 
(Version 22, Bar Ilan Responsa Project ed., 2013). 
 95.  Thus, for example, Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer) states that “a man who rapes a woman . . . is 
obligated to marry her, so long as she . . . wish[es] to marry him, even if she is crippled or blind, and he is not 
permitted to divorce her forever, except with her consent, and thus he does not have to write her a ketubah.” 
Id. at 177:3. The logic seems clear. Since he cannot divorce her under any circumstances without her con-
sent, the presence or absence of a ketubah seems to make no difference to her economic status or marital 
security. When they both want to get divorced, they will agree on financial terms independent of the ketubah,
and until then, the ketubah sets no payment schedule. Should she insist that she only will consent to be 
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nearly 500 years ago: “Thus, nowadays, in our countries, where we do not 
divorce against the will of the wife because of the ban of Rabbenu Ger-
shom . . . it is possible to be lenient and not write a ketubah at all [when get-
ting married] . . . .”96
Of course, the ketubah did remain a fixture of Jewish weddings after the 
tenth century,97 but it was transformed from a marriage contract that governed 
a contractual marriage to a ritual document whose transfer initiated a cove-
nantal marriage. The ketubah held no economic or other value as a contract. 
Indeed, the contractual model of marriage ended for those Jews—all Europe-
an Jews—who accepted the refinements of Rabbenu Gershom. Consider the 
observation of Rabbi Moses Feinstein, the leading American Jewish law au-
thority of the last century, on this matter: 
The value of the ketubah is not known to rabbis and decisors of Jewish 
law, or rabbinical court judges; indeed we have not examined this matter 
intensely as for all matters of divorce it has no practical ramifications, 
since it is impossible for the man to divorce against the will of the wom-
an, [the economics of] divorce are dependent on who desires to be di-
vorced . . . .98
Notwithstanding this fact, one still occasionally sees American courts 
actually looking at the ketubah as a valid Jewish marriage “contract” be-
tween the husband and wife and seeking to enforce its provisions.99 To 
make this matter even more complex, the trend in modern rabbinical courts 
in Israel is that the ketubah is the basis for divorce settlements and is in fact 
enforced, in accordance with the older Talmudic custom and the prevailing 
norm of Sephardic Jews,100 which is distinctly different from the modern 
American practice (which is frequently to use secular law concepts such as 
equitable distribution to reflect the actual intent of the parties as to how 
 96.  Id. at 66:3. 
 97.  Broyde & Reiss, supra note 84, at 118–19. 
 98.  MOSES FEINSTEIN, IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 4:91. This responsum was written in 1980. 
 99.  See, e.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 901–02 (Ariz. 1993); In Re Marriage of Goldman, 
554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the words “in accordance with the law of 
Moses and Israel” appearing in the ketubah created a contractual obligation to give a Get); Avitzur v. 
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983); Hurwitz v. Hurwitz , 216 A.D. 362, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928); 
In re Estate of White, 356 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210 (N.Y. Sur. Ct., 1974). But see Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 
523, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (rejecting a similar argument); Morris v. Morris (1973), 42 
D.L.R. 3d 550 (Can. Man. C.A.). For more on this, see RABBI YITZCHAK BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL 
AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 50–55 (1993), and Helfand 
& Richman, supra note 20, which calls for courts to distinguish between contract and ceremony, a very 
astute observation. 
 100.  See Michael Broyde & Jonathan Reiss, Erkah shel Ha-Ketubah [The Value of the Ketubah],
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they wish to govern their divorce).101 The complexity is clear: Jewish law 
courts sometimes point to secular law as the basis for Jewish divorce law, 
and secular courts sometimes point to Jewish law. Religious arbitration 
tribunals that are not sufficiently in tune with how religious law, secular 
law, and common custom actually work on the street can thus easily reach 
wrong decisions, undermining confidence in such tribunals’ professional-
ism in the eyes of secular courts and their constituent religious communi-
ties.
But, you might ask—reasonably so—what is so bad about wrong deci-
sions? They are nonetheless legally binding through secular arbitration law, 
so how do even “wrong” decisions detract from the legitimacy of religious 
arbitration? The answer is clear: a pattern of “wrong” outcomes under-
mines legitimacy because litigants simply will not repeatedly use any pro-
cess that produces binding but wrong results, even if they sometimes win 
unjustly: When a businesswoman wins a case that she knows she should 
have lost, she says to herself, “Wow, thank goodness I won this time. But, 
I’m never going back to this panel, because in the next case that I should 
win, I very well might lose.” Arbitral decisions that are enforced, but 
thought of as wrong by the community, undermine the community’s sense 
that its judicial process is fair, reasonable, and useful—whether or not it is 
binding. Community members simply will not consistently use a process 
that is binding, but irrational. 
VII. RELIANCE ON ARBITRATORS WITH BROAD DUAL-SYSTEM
EXPERTISE
Partially to address these complexities, successful religious arbitra-
tional panels not only pick people who are experts in their own religious 
law and secular law, but experts in the particular matter at hand. Thus when 
dealing with building construction matters, they employ an expert in con-
struction matters. And for dental malpractice, dentistry. Similarly, if a reli-
gious tribunal expects to hear matters of child custody, having a child 
psychologist present (either with the panel or on the panel) would seem 
helpful and increases the likelihood of secular affirmance.102
 101.  See, for example, the standard prenuptial agreement used in the Orthodox Jewish community, 
which gives two choices for how to divide assets in the case of divorce, each grounded in secular law. 
THE PRENUP, http://theprenup.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2014); see also BROYDE, supra note 87, at 127–
36. 
 102.  See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, What’s Love Got to Do with It?(Part I): Loving Children in 
Cases of Divorce or Death in the Jewish Tradition, in THE BEST LOVE OF THE CHILD: BEING LOVED 
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In recognition of this, Jewish law does not strictly require that arbitra-
tors be rabbis but allows the parties to accept panel members who are quali-
fied in other ways.103 Because of this, and given that the Jewish tradition 
allows panels of three, one does not have to find a single individual who is 
a Jewish law scholar, an American law scholar, and a skilled dentist 
(though such experts undoubtedly exist); rather, the arbitration panel can be 
comprised of various subject-matter experts, and the three put together 
reach a resolution. 
This complexity is part and parcel of the problem of religious arbitra-
tion of both commercial and family law matters: by default, the arbitration 
panel must include people who are fluent in more than one legal system 
and more than one cultural reality. American law does not require this level 
of expertise and does not have to. Because the dominant legal culture rea-
sonably assumes that all adhere to its social cultural and legal norms, judg-
es need not wonder if the parties actually intend to follow the common law 
of the land. Furthermore, consistent with its contractarian model, the FAA 
does not restrict arbitrators to experts and allows parties to pick three blind 
mice, more or less.104
But litigants who live in more than one cultural norm will not use a 
service that selects single system experts; only multi-system experts will 
succeed and only those able to determine which system provides the proper 
rules for the case at hand will actually be successful. So this is a balance 
not just of what arbitration law allows, but the reality of what sophisticated 
consumers in a narrow religious community will insist, which is that you 
need to appoint arbitrators who understand the very complex legal, social, 
and cultural mores of religious communities in America. Although some 
religious communities are totally separatist and look to secular law and 
culture for virtually nothing, most religious communities are not in that 
model. These communities are in a perpetually dynamic relationship with 
secular law and secular society, incorporating secular legal rules and ideas 
into their commercial and family law—and to do justice, the arbitrators 
chosen by this community ought to be engaged themselves with that dy-
namic interaction.105
 103.  See KARO, supra note 67, at 7:1–2. 
 104.  Of course, neither the American nor the Jewish tradition actually allows mice to serve as 
arbitrators. See KARO, supra note 67, at 7, for a list of the minimal qualifications to be arbitrators. 
 105.  Let me add that within the traditional Jewish community that I am part of, secular law norms 
have made greater inroads in the area of commercial law than in the area of family law. This is, I sus-
pect, typically true of conservative religious faiths, but is not axiomatically correct. One could construct 
a sexually progressive but economically conservative religion as well. See, e.g., HERESY AND 
AUTHORITY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (Edward Peters ed., 1980) (this is a collection of primary sources, 
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VIII. COMMUNAL BENEFITS
Although this phenomenon is worthy of a paper of its own, religious 
leadership that resolves disputes between parties ultimately serves a role in 
shaping the community, no differently than judges in any society. What 
flows from this observation is less of a requirement than a consequence, but 
any discussion of what happens when judicial structure is introduced into 
religious community would be incomplete without it. Religious tribunals, 
once up and running, begin to assume roles in communal governance: this 
should seem clear to any who look at a history of the Catholic religious 
tribunals in the United States.106 It is not enough for a faith—or even a 
legal system—to have rules; it has to have a judicial process (we call them 
arbitration panels in this article) that applies those rules to the reality it 
confronts.
When this system is respected by peer religious organizations within 
the same faith as producing religiously reliable and functionally realistic 
answers to the pressing questions they have, this adjudicative body be-
comes the location members of the religious communities go to when they 
have disputes, not just about buying and selling houses or marriage and 
divorce, but about territorial, jurisprudential, and even theological matters 
that coreligionists sometimes disagree about. Without this, even members 
of the same faith, who share an identical vision of the grander questions of 
community, life, and God, will sometimes fight about the mundanely paro-
chial and sometimes even more important issues that can generate institu-
tional conflict. 
Dispute resolution for the faithful will resolve not only mundane dis-
putes but also communal disputes. Within the Jewish tradition, this has 
clearly happened, and it is a consequence of building structure: religious 
institutions prefer law to politics as a method of dispute resolution, and if 
there is a court that shares their religious values, they will use it. This will 
build a tighter cooperation among the community of the faithful, as the 
organs of justice will share their religious values. Over time, this gives the 
community increased structure, stability, and cohesiveness. And I expect 
this to be true not only of particular Jewish law courts, but of a wide variety 
the ideas presented in this essay are useful not only for conservative religions but liberal ones. The 
question of how to structure one’s community when secular law is not to the liking of one’s faith is a 
universal one. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), reh’g denied, 699 
So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1997). 
 106.  Indeed, this is much more part of the mission of the canon law courts than any other mission. 
See, e.g., Code of Canon Law, VATICAN, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_INDEX.HTM (last 
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of religious and values-oriented forums for dispute resolution. The Catholic 
model in America—which is uniquely hierarchical and thus does not serve 
as a general precedent for most American faiths—can be built by this pro-
cess but most likely will not.107
IX. LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES
The formation of religious communities in America is, I would pro-
pose, dramatically assisted by the modern rise of contract law as the central 
touchstone of dispute resolution. A secular legal system that functions 
based on its sacrament—not only marriage sacrament, but sacrament in all 
areas of the law—looks at people and communities with alternative legal 
rules and denies them the right to be adjudicated by any legal rules other 
than the law of the state, because its legal rules are sacred, so that even if 
the parties wish to apply them, the legal system refuses to do so.108
Consider for example the view endorsed by Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
a century ago while he was a member of the New York Court of Appeals. 
Cardozo noted: 
In each case, however, the fundamental purpose of the contract [of arbi-
tration] is the same—to submit the rights and wrongs of litigants to the 
arbitrament of foreign judges to the exclusion of our own. Whether such 
a contract is always invalid where the tribunal is a foreign court we do 
not need to determine. There may conceivably be exceptional circum-
stances where resort to be courts of another state is so obviously conven-
ient and reasonable as to justify our own courts in yielding to the 
agreement of the parties and declining jurisdiction. . . . If jurisdiction is 
to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of justice that 
may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges have 
expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such 
 107.  Since the Catholic model has but one mother church and expects full obedience to it by all of 
its subsidiaries. This model does not fit the religious ideology of most American faiths, in that the 
Catholic Church is so broadly interconnected as a single whole church, whereas almost all other Ameri-
can faith groups expect and grant their local communities much more religious, legal, and ideological 
autonomy. 
 108.  For an example of this, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which applies to racial 
matters. Although this requires more analysis, Shelley is undoubtedly correct in its analysis of racial 
matters exactly because the choice to discriminate based on race is constitutionally suspect. The single 
greatest challenge politically to religious arbitration agreements remains, I suspect, the sense (perhaps 
even true in certain settings) that religious arbitration discriminates based on values that secular society 
views as not proper to discriminate. I would suggest however, that Shelley is unusual in that the contract 
in Shelley was designed to impact those who had not signed it (by creating covenants that ran with the 
land). Parties ought to have the right to construct their more private matters with values that otherwise 
discriminate. For example, most states have doctrines of sexual freedom that protect the right to commit 
adultery, see, for example, People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943 (N.Y. 1980), but that does not mean 
that parties cannot agree in a prenuptial agreement that such conduct is to be financially penalized by 
contract. See also Note, Racial Steering in the Romantic Marketplace, 107 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1994) 
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matters as they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the 
contrary. The jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, and is not 
to be diminished, any more than it is to be increased, by the convention 
of the parties.109
The facts of the case involved a contract with both a choice of law to 
an alternative legal system and a choice of forum to private arbitration.110
Neither choice of law nor choice of forum arbitration is permitted in this 
view.
Notwithstanding Cardozo’s venerable view, this is not the trend in 
modern American society or law, where both choice of law and choice of 
forum (including private arbitration) are all considered proper. For exam-
ple, if there is one characteristic of the Uniform Commercial Code that is 
central, it is that almost any of its provisions may be modified by agree-
ment of the parties.111 Our American legal system is moving faster and 
faster into contract as the foundational doctrine. 
Under a system that takes contract as a foundational doctrine, religious 
communities with well-written contracts will grow, thrive, and prosper 
precisely because as a society we can no longer agree on a single definition 
for what were once commonly held legal sacraments. For example, if tradi-
tionalists and progressives are to reach a workable détente on divisive ques-
tions of marriage equality, it will not be because all agree with a single 
vision about who should marry, what a civil union looks like, or what 
equality in marriage means. Rather it will be because the government will 
increasingly move to the contract model of unions, in which its secular 
 109.  Meacham v. Jamestown, J. & C. R. Co, 105 N.E. 653, 655 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 110.  The contract stated: 
In order to prevent all disputes and misunderstandings between them in relation to any of the 
stipulations contained in this agreement, or their performance by either of said parties, it is 
mutually understood and agreed that the said chief engineer shall be and hereby is made arbi-
trator to decide all matters in dispute arising or growing out of this contract between them, 
and the decision of said chief engineer on any point or matter touching this contract shall be 
final and conclusive between the parties hereto, and each and every of said parties hereby 
waives all right of action, suit or suits or other remedy in law or otherwise under this contract 
or arising out of the same to enforce any claim except as the same shall have been determined 
by said arbitrator. 
Id. at 347. 
 111.  Variation By Agreement: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or elsewhere in [the Uniform Commercial 
Code], the effect of provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agree-
ment. 
. . .  
The presence in certain provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] of the phrase “unless 
otherwise agreed”, or words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of other provi-
sions may not be varied by agreement under this section. 
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model is merely the default model.112 And what will faith-based communi-
ties do? They will write their own contracts of marriage, or even appeal to 
secular authorities to recognize that marriages performed by their own 
clergy have different rules and ought to have a different secular law.113 One 
group’s contracts will be different from another’s contracts, which will be 
different still from others’. Indeed, within the Jewish tradition there might 
be more than one model of contract than people can choose to enter. That is 
the joy of contracts: they are almost endlessly customizable. 
Furthermore, the “Rise of Contract” as a fundamental basis of liberty 
allows for the proliferation of a wide array of religious arbitration tribunals 
across the United States. Of course, there has to be limitations: operating 
within the context of a secular legal system means that arbitration panels 
that enforce religious-legal norms must accept that religious principles will 
not excuse religious parties from criminal and other forms of liability under 
the relevant secular legal system.114 As the wise Professor John Witte, Jr. 
notes, “Even the most devout religious believer has no claim to exemptions 
from criminal laws against activities like polygamy, child marriage, female 
genital mutilation, or corporal discipline of wives, even if 
their . . . particular religious community commands it.”115 In order to garner 
the respect of the secular justice system by genuinely respecting secular 
 112.  At least one province in Canada has gone in a different direction, prohibiting the private 
arbitration of all family law matters according to any substantive law other than that of the Canadian 
Province. A decade ago, Ontario considered the prospect of private arbitration by Islamic tribunals in 
accordance with religious law under general arbitration statutes. A report produced by the former 
attorney general recommended authorizing religious arbitration in family and inheritance law, subject to 
46 proposed “safeguards.” MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING 
CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 133–42 (2004), available at 
 http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf. The report generated 
significant political backlash; ultimately, Ontario’s Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17 (Can.), and Family 
Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (Can.), were amended to require that family arbitration be “conducted 
exclusively in accordance with the law of Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction.” Family Statute 
Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Can.). “Family arbitration” was defined as “arbitration 
that . . . deals with matters that could be dealt with in a marriage contract, separation agreement, cohabi-
tation agreement or paternity agreement.” Id. § 1(a). 
 113.  This is exactly the history of the New York Jewish Divorce Law, where the state of New 
York enacted a special provision of the law regulating marriages done by clergy who have specific 
requirements for divorce. For more on this, see Broyde, supra note 86, at 138. 
 114.  See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 422–23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), a recent New Jersey 
case that evoked nation-wide criticism of Islamic law and the relationship between Muslim religious 
norms and the American justice system. This case illustrates the importance of Islamic arbitral courts’ 
teaching their communities about the importance of following American law, even when it prohibits 
acts that may be permitted under religious law. It is worth noting that this case was affirmed on appeal. 
 115.  John Witte, Jr., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in SHARIA IN THE 
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law, arbitration institutions must educate their communities on the necessi-
ty of adhering to general legal norms.116
So too, religious arbitration cannot address matters that are not fun-
damentally contractual between the parties. Occasionally, such exclusive, 
binding authority is not limited to criminal matters; it is found in certain 
civil matters, such as bankruptcy law, as well. According to federal law, 
after a party has filed for bankruptcy, there is an automatic stay in place, 
and no one may interfere with or seek to collect a debt without the bank-
ruptcy court’s permission.117 Private arbitration panels are bound by this 
limitation, and rulings that violate the automatic stay will simply be disre-
garded.118
But this will be the exception and not the rule. In most areas, the law 
should not grant unique and exclusive authority to the state. If anything, the 
trend is to move further and deeper into contract and less and less into 
fixed, sacramental models set by the government that one cannot opt out of 
at all. 
One final observation is worth noting. All of this need not be so: the 
law need not be this friendly to religious groups. Some secular legal re-
gimes leave no breathing room for crafting private agreements that go 
against secular norms. One province in Canada has already legislatively 
prohibited private adjudication in family law matters119 and France, follow-
ing the principles of laïcité (the secular legal norms in France) is throttling 
communal religious values.120 It is worth recognizing that it is possible to 
suffocate communal religious liberty without denying personal religious 
freedom (which no democracy can do). When both the substantive law is 
secular and the arbitration law resists the application of legal rules selected 
by the parties contractually in private law, religious communities can no 
 116.  Based on this, one suspects that communities like the Christian Domestic Discipline commu-
nity will ultimately be subject to significant legal sanction over the use of force. See Welcome to CDD,
CHRISTIAN DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE, http://christiandomesticdiscipline.com/home.html (last visited Nov. 
25, 2014). Indeed, these communities seem aware of this issue and seek to address it through general 
consent. See “Nonconsensual” Consent? A Guideline to Consent in CDD, CHRISTIAN DOMESTIC 
DISCIPLINE, http://christiandomesticdiscipline.com/nonconsensualconsent.html (last visited Nov. 25, 
2014). But, there is ample legal precedent for the idea that the state sanctioned monopoly on force—
particularly in the area of domestic violence—will not be set aside without a much more particular and 
detailed consent by the woman being hit. 
 117.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2010). 
 118.  See Michael A Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial 
Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 187–88 (2011). 
 119.  Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Can.). 
 120.  See generally Knowledge Resources, GEORGETOWN UNIV.: BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION,
PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/countries/france (last visited 
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longer function. Of course, France does not suffocate individual religious 
liberty, but in insisting that every dispute between two or more people be 
resolved without reference to the religious rules that the parties wished to 
govern them, this religious community is vastly diminished. 
On the other hand, one can have a very secular state with very vibrant 
religious communities existing side by side, so long as all parties respect 
the distinction between public and private law and allow contractual arbi-
tration law to operate under any substantive legal rubric the parties agree 
to. New York State is such an example.121 Liberal and secular western de-
mocracy is compatible with religious community. 
In sum, we in America live in a society in which religious traditions—
Judeo-Christian or otherwise—have receded to the background of our legal 
culture, and the legal norms that once reflected those values are being re-
placed by secular principles, the most fundamental of which seems to be 
contract law. What this means is that our law is increasingly open to the 
idea that people can structure their relationships around a contract, rather 
than around sacrament. And the default model doesn’t need to be the only 
model—customization can be allowed and even expected. 
CONCLUSION
It is very important to appreciate the unique benefits conferred to reli-
gious freedoms in America through the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
provides protection of private dispute resolution though arbitration by reli-
gious communities. This protection provides a viable option for maintain-
ing religious communities that wish to organize themselves around values 
they no longer share with an increasingly tolerant and neutral secular 
law.122
 121.  In that, for example, New York has same sex marriage and is widely considered one of the 
most liberal states of the union, and yet has the most vibrant Orthodox Jewish and Catholic communi-
ties. Furthermore, as noted in Broyde, supra note 86, at 161–62, New York uniquely accommodates 
Jewish and Islamic marriage law with special statutory provisions. 
 122.  Although beyond the scope of this article, there is good reason to suspect that a state that 
sought to prohibit religious arbitration, but would permit that same arbitration by any non-state law so 
long as such law is not religious, would violate the core holding of Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School, 533 U.S. 98, 109 (2001). The question of whether religious arbitration of secular matters could 
and should be prohibited by statute is discussed in Walter, supra note 6, at 557, and he concludes that 
such arbitration should be prohibited. Putting aside the religious discrimination problem of the govern-
ment allowing all arbitration other than religious arbitration, I think the policy concerns that he worries 
about—that religious arbitration curtails the right of people to change their faith (the “exit” problem)—
strikes me as not important when religious arbitration is viewed as just another form of contract. Of 
course, by contract, one can and does abandon deeply held constitutional rights and loses one’s right to 
change one’s mind. A person by contract can forsake his right to work as a journalist (a First Amend-
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Traditional communities ought to recognize that in matters on which 
they hold cultural values that are different from the majority of the polity, 
they can—and if they are to stay viable, sometimes must—opt out of socie-
ty’s legal structure to avoid being suffocated. Private arrangement of family 
matters can be a viable option for those who, for example, do not believe in 
unilateral no-fault divorce, do not believe in divorce, or do not believe in 
marriage. This is true whether we are talking about Jewish courts, Sharia 
courts, Evangelical Christian courts, Canon law courts, or Hindu tribunals. 
Whatever the differences, if religious communities are to avoid suffocating 
in this secular atmosphere, it is because the secular society recognizes the 
right of parties to contract out of the general law. Those communities wise 
enough to take advantage of the six principles necessary to successfully opt 
out, implement them, and build religious arbitration tribunals, will flourish. 
These communities will be gloriously different, each in its own way, each 
sharing its religious values in a grand whole, and each exercising the free-
dom to maintain its own set of beliefs and practices within the majestic 
mosaic of diverse communities that make up our United States. 
right), and many other rights. Free exercise rights are no more jeopardized by enforcing contracts for 
religious arbitration than contractual waiver of a right to trial by jury endangers jury trial rights. 
